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Lessons from the British and 
American Approaches to Compelled 
Decryption 
As society careens faster and faster into the digital age, 
the amount of information stored electronically will only 
continue to grow.1 This proliferation of electronic storage has 
given rise to new threats to data security, both legal and 
illegal.2 To protect against these extrinsic threats, people have 
increasingly turned to data encryption, a process that renders 
data unintelligible to unauthorized viewers.3 Due to the limits 
of current technology, encryption software programs, some of 
which are available free to the public,4 can render data 
virtually indecipherable without access to the appropriate 
encryption key or password.5 Encryption is a “double-edged 
  
 1 The amount of data stored electronically has grown exponentially in the 
last several decades. See generally Larry Swezey, It’s Happening Now: This Is the Tera 
Era of Data Storage, COMPUTER TECH. REV., Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.wwpi.com/ 
index.php?view=article&id=6146. 
 2 Illegal threats to electronically stored data include identity theft, corporate 
espionage, phishing, etc. See generally Terrence Berg, The Changing Face of 
Cybercrime: New Internet Threats Create Challenges to Law Enforcement, 86 MICH. B.J. 
18, 18 (2007). 
 3 See generally infra note 14; see also Press Release, PGP Corp., Aberdeen 
Group Research Reveals Increased Use of Encryption by Top Performing, Best-in-Class 
Companies (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.pgp.com/insight/newsroom/ 
press_releases/aberdeen_group_research.html (“[T]he use of encryption to protect 
sensitive data in the enterprise is becoming even more pervasive . . . .”). 
 4 A powerful encryption software program, named TrueCrypt, can be 
downloaded free of charge at the TrueCrypt web site. TrueCrypt, Downloads, 
http://www.truecrypt.org/downloads (last visited Aug. 28, 2009). 
 5 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher, with regard to the government’s 
efforts to decrypt seized encrypted files, a Secret Service agent testified “that it is 
nearly impossible to access these encrypted files without knowing the password. . . . 
The only way to get access without the password is to use an automated system which 
repeatedly guesses passwords. According to the government, the process . . . could take 
years . . . .” In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher I), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 
WL 4246473, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. 
Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); see also D. Forest Wolfe, The Government’s Right to Read: 
Maintaining State Access to Digital Data in the Age of Impenetrable Encryption, 49 
EMORY L.J. 711, 712 (2000) (“Modern computerized cryptography uses encryption 
algorithms to keep digital information private, and the most complex of these 
algorithms can encode data so thoroughly that it would take millennia to decipher it 
with current technology.” (citations omitted)); see infra Part II.B. Of course, future 
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sword,” and can be used by criminals and ordinary citizens 
alike.6 This presents a major dilemma for law enforcement 
officials, who, without the proper legal mechanisms, would be 
practically powerless to gather electronic evidence in the face of 
widespread encryption.7 
Because the trend towards the ever increasing use of 
data encryption is not confined to the United States, the 
aforementioned dilemma is an issue for law enforcement 
agencies around the world. Despite being faced with the same 
problem, countries have adopted different solutions. In 
particular, the United States and Great Britain have 
approached the dilemma in vastly different fashions. 
Great Britain has taken a direct, and decidedly pro-law 
enforcement, approach. Under Part III of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (“RIPA”), various British 
governmental actors are empowered to compel decryption and 
criminally charge citizens who refuse to comply.8 This statute 
has drawn criticism from a variety of groups, ranging from civil 
rights activists to citizens concerned about the deleterious 
effect the statute could have on the British economy.9 
The United States has adopted an entirely different 
approach.10 Unlike Great Britain, the United States has, as of 
now, declined to statutorily grant law enforcement the power to 
compel decryption.11 Due to this lack of statutory guidance, the 
issue of compelled decryption has been left to the judiciary. 
Although case law on the subject is extremely limited, at least 
one early decision has analyzed this problem under Fifth 
  
advances in technology are hard to predict, and there could be major advances in either 
encryption or encryption-cracking technology. It is part of an ongoing struggle between 
those creating more powerful encryption and those creating more powerful computers 
to break encryption. See Dawn Walton, A Quantum Leap in Information Security, 
GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 3, 2007, at B9 (discussing a very advanced form of encryption in 
development called quantum cryptography). 
 6 Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement at Hearing of 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government 
Information on “The Encryption Debate: Criminals, Terrorists, And the Security Needs 
of Business and Industry” (Sept. 3, 1997), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/ 
press/199709/970903.html (“As with other dual-use technologies, encryption has both 
good and bad uses.”). 
 7 Infra Part I.B.  
 8 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, ch. 23, §§ 49-56 (Eng.). 
 9 See infra Part IV.A. 
 10 Jeffrey Yeates, CALEA and the RIPA: The U.S. and the U.K. Responses to 
Wiretapping in an Increasingly Wireless World, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 125, 141 
(2001) (“Significantly, [under CALEA] telecom carriers have no responsibility to 
decrypt any encrypted communications or ensure that law enforcement can do so.”). 
 11 See generally id. 
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Amendment jurisprudence.12 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena to 
Boucher, a magistrate judge in the District of Vermont ruled 
that the federal government could not compel a citizen to turn 
over his encryption password because doing so would infringe 
upon his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.13  
Both approaches are decidedly problematic, albeit in 
different ways. The British approach, while highly protective of 
law enforcement interests, encroaches too far on individual 
civil liberties. The American approach, as typified by Boucher, 
while adequately protecting civil liberties, leaves the 
government without the proper tools to effectively fight crime 
in a digital age. The consequences of the ubiquitous use of 
unbreakable encryption by criminals like terrorists, hackers, 
child pornographers, and members of organized crime 
syndicates, to name a few, would be devastating.14 This Note 
  
 12 The first case, as far as my research has revealed, to deal with this issue is 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher, which analyzed the issue under Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher I), No. 
2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 
WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). Notably, on February 19, 2009, the decision was 
reversed by District Judge William K. Sessions on narrow grounds. In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher II), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 
2009); see also infra note 50. Judge Sessions held that, due to a body of law called the 
foregone conclusion doctrine, the defendant would not be able to resist the 
governmental order to turn over his password. Boucher II, 2009 WL 424718, at *3-4; 
see also infra notes 104-111 and accompanying text. This narrow holding does not alter 
the following analysis because where the foregone conclusion doctrine does not apply, 
defendants could still seek refuge in the Fifth Amendment. 
 13 Boucher II, 2009 WL 424718, at *3. 
 14 In a 1997 press release, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) stated,  
We are all acutely aware of, and concerned about, the “bad” uses of 
encryption by criminals, who want to thwart police surveillance of their 
criminal activities, and by spies, who engage in activities harmful to our 
national security. The Working Group report contains startling estimates of 
50 to 100 percent in the future annual growth rates for criminal uses of 
encryption. Even if the impact on law enforcement is not great now, the 
potential future impact is alarming. 
Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement at Hearing of Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information on “The 
Encryption Debate: Criminals, Terrorists, And the Security Needs of Business and 
Industry” (Sept. 3, 1997), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/199709/ 
970903.html; see also Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing 
on H.R. 850 Before the H. Armed Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Janet 
Reno, Att’y Gen. of the United States), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
archive/ag/testimony/1999/agarmed071399.htm (“[I]t will become far more difficult for 
the FBI, DEA, and other federal, state, and local, law enforcement agencies, faced with 
the rising threat from the criminal use of commercially available encryption, to protect 
the public from crimes such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, economic fraud, and 
child pornography.”). 
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examines both methods and argues that America should devise 
a new approach by drawing upon the strengths of each tack 
and devise a middle ground that provides for both effective law 
enforcement and adequate protection of civil liberties. 
Part I of this Note briefly describes the history and 
technical background of encryption. Then, Part II discusses the 
American approach to compelled decryption and the 
application of the Fifth Amendment, while Part III analyzes 
the British approach of statutorily compelled decryption. Next, 
Part IV discusses the criticisms levied at both of the 
approaches and proposes a statutory middle ground based, in 
part, on the federal wiretap statute in the Omnibus Crime 
Control Statute. Finally, the Note concludes with a reiteration 
of the notion that both approaches have fundamental flaws and 
that American policy makers should consider adopting a 
middle ground. 
I. HISTORY AND TECHNICAL BACKGROUND OF ENCRYPTION 
The goal of encryption is to safeguard important data 
from unauthorized viewing by third parties.15 Although modern 
encryption in its digital form is a relatively recent innovation, 
more primitive forms have been in existence for thousands of 
years.16 With the passage of time and advances in technology, 
encryption techniques have grown immensely more 
sophisticated.17 Currently, freely available software can render 
data virtually undecipherable without the proper password or 
encryption key.18  
A. History and Background of Encryption 
Cryptography, the science of secret writing,19 is the 
means by which parties can safeguard their important 
information by preventing unauthorized access. In order to 
keep information secret, a party will encrypt it, which is the 
method by which a message is rendered undecipherable to 
third parties, and in order for the authorized party to read the 
  
 15 See infra text accompanying notes 19-20, 24-27. 
 16 See infra text accompanying notes 24-27. 
 17 See Part I.B. 
 18 See supra note 4. 
 19 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 439 
(Houghton Mifflin Co., 4th ed. 2000) (defining cryptography as “1. The process or skill 
of communicating in or deciphering secret writings or ciphers. 2. Secret writing.”). 
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hidden message, it must be decrypted, which is the method by 
which a secret message is turned into regular text.20 Depending 
on whether the data is encrypted or decrypted, it is referred to 
as “plaintext” or “ciphertext.” Plaintext is the underlying 
information that is being encrypted—i.e., the secret message or 
document that is meant to be protected.21 Ciphertext is the 
product of the encryption—i.e., the undecipherable text in 
which the message is hidden.22 Anyone wishing to uncover the 
secret message, including governments acting in their criminal 
investigatory capacities, will be after the underlying data, i.e., 
the plaintext.23 
States and individuals have relied on cryptography to 
safeguard critical information and communications throughout 
history. A primitive example of the practice, reported by Greek 
historian Herodotus, involved the tattooing of a secret message 
on the scalp of a slave, allowing the slave’s hair to grow back, 
and then sending the slave to the recipient of the message so 
that his head could be shaved and the secret message 
revealed.24 Julius Caesar employed a slightly more advanced 
method of cryptography in ancient Roman times.25 Fearing that 
his military communiqués would be intercepted, Caesar 
employed the simple cryptographic process of shifting every 
letter in the alphabet up three steps, such that a “B” would 
become a “E,” and a “P” would become an “S.”26 Since the days 
of Herodotus and Julius Caesar, encryption methods have 
evolved from simple ciphers, to complex mechanical devices,27 
  
 20 Id. at 589 (defining encrypt as “[t]o alter (a file, for example) using a secret 
code so as to be unintelligible to unauthorized parties”). Id. at 473 (defining decryption 
as “[a] deciphered or decoded message”). 
 21 Phillip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 172 n.8 (1996) (“‘Plaintext’ is unencrypted or decrypted text; 
‘ciphertext’ is encrypted text.”). 
 22 Id. 
 23 The government, in attempting to acquire criminal evidence where 
encryption has been utilized, will seek to gain either the plaintext, or the encryption 
key/password so that they can decipher the ciphertext on their own. Reitinger, supra 
note 21, at 175. Regardless, the ultimate aim of the government is to uncover the 
underlying data, i.e., the plaintext. 
 24 HERODOTUS, 3 THE HISTORY OF HERODOTUS 197 (George Rawlinson trans., 
D. Appleton & Co. 1889) (“Thus accordingly he did; and as soon as ever the hair was 
grown, he despatched the man to Miletus giving him no other message than this—
‘When thou art come to Miletus, bid Aristagoras shave thy head and look thereon.’”). 
 25 Adam C. Bonin, Protecting Protection: First and Fifth Amendment 
Challenges to Cryptography Regulation, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495, 497 (1996). 
 26 Id. 
 27 See Aaron M. Clemens, No Computer Exception to the Constitution: The 
Fifth Amendment Protects Against Compelled Production of an Encrypted Document or 
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and finally to digital encryption of electronic data. Today, 
electronic encryption has become standard practice for 
governments, corporations, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, 
individuals.28  
B. Technical Background  
Although the basic idea of cryptography is simple, in 
fact it can be a quite complex process. As one might suspect, in 
today’s digital world, ciphers are no longer created and decoded 
simply by tattooing or transcribing letters. Rather, quite 
intricate methods are required to encrypt and decrypt 
messages.  
First, in order to decrypt information that has been 
encrypted using modern techniques, an “encryption key” is 
needed. An encryption key is essentially a very long string of 
numbers whose length makes it extremely hard to memorize.29 
Users of encryption software generally do not have to 
remember this long number and, instead, can enter a more 
easily remembered password or passphrase, which in turn 
activates the encryption key.30 Thus, when the government 
seeks to compel an ordinary citizen to turn over the means by 
which he can decrypt the data, the disclosure order will 
  
Private Key, 8 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 4 n.26 (2004) (describing the German Enigma 
machine). 
 28 See David B. Walker, Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption Policy—A Call 
for Congressional Action, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 14 (1999) (“Encryption is 
becoming a central fixture in the burgeoning electronic commerce industry.”). See 
generally Declan McCullagh, CNET NEWS, Obama’s New BlackBerry: The NSA’s 
Secure PDA?, Jan. 13, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/obamas-new-blackberry-the-nsas-
secure-pda/ (discussing balancing President-Elect Barack Obama’s desire to continue 
using his mobile email device with the paramount need to encrypt sensitive data). 
 29 Anoop MS, Public Key Cryptography: Applications Algorithms and 
Mathematical Explanations 2 (2007), available at http://www.tataelxsi.com/ 
whitepapers/pub_key2.pdf?pdf_id=public_key_TEL.pdf [hereinafter Public Key 
Cryptography] (“The public key algorithms operate on sufficiently large numbers to 
make [deriving the private key from the public key] practically impossible and thus 
make the system secure. For example, RSA algorithm operates on large numbers of 
thousands of bits long.”); see also Reitinger, supra note 21, at 174 (“For example, the 
widely used Data Encryption Standard (“DES”) algorithm uses a single key fifty-six 
bits in length—up to more than 70,000,000,000,000,000 in decimal notation—for both 
encryption and decryption. Public-key algorithms use different keys for encryption and 
decryption, and much longer keys, such as 512 (and greater) bit numbers—over 150 
decimal digits.” (footnote omitted)). 
 30 Such a password would be similar to the password used to log into an 
email account, or the pin number used to access a bank account at an ATM. 
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typically compel him to turn over his password rather than the 
encryption key.31 
There are two methods of using encryption keys—public 
key encryption and private key encryption. Historically, most 
encryption was accomplished via the private key method. In 
the simplest of terms, a private key system involves one key 
that is used for both encrypting and decrypting the encoded 
message.32 The sender uses a certain key to encrypt the 
message, and the receiver uses that same key to decrypt it.33  
In 197634 Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman proposed 
a new method of encryption: public key encryption.35 In this 
system, there are two keys, a public key, which is used for 
encryption, and a private key, which is used for decryption.36 
The public key is available to the public at large, and the 
private key is known only to the person using the encryption.37 
Thus, for example, if one wishes to send a secure message 
using this type of encryption, he would encrypt the message 
using a public key, send it, and then the recipient would 
decrypt the message using her private key.38 One hoping to 
intercept and decrypt this message would be unable to do so 
using only the public key because it is a “computationally 
infeasible” task to derive the private key from the public key.39 
In other words, the reason it is difficult to break strong 
encryption is that while it is a simple task to compute the 
public key from the private key, it is extremely difficult to do 
the opposite and derive the private key from the public key.40 
  
 31 This was the case in Boucher. The government sought to force Mr. Boucher 
to turn over his encryption password. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher 
(Boucher I), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 
2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 32 Wolfe, supra note 5, at 715. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Public key encryption was actually invented earlier than 1976 by members 
of the British Government Communications Headquarters, but their findings were not 
disclosed. Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad: An Historical Perspective on Software 
Patents, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 230 (2005). 
 35 Whitfield Diffie & Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, 12 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 644 (1976). 
 36 Public Key Cryptography, supra note 29, at 3. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Diffie & Hellman, supra note 35, at 644. 
 40 Public Key Cryptography, supra note 29, at 1-2. It is a computationally 
infeasible task to derive the private key because: 
The private and public key of a device is related by the mathematical 
function called the one-way function. One-way functions are mathematical 
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This is known as a “one-way function” because it is only easily 
solvable in one direction.41 The only way to ascertain the 
private key in such circumstances is to use a specialized 
computer program that guesses, one at a time, the correct 
number.42 This process can take an exceptionally long time.43 
Thus, it is virtually impossible to break strong public key 
encryption without compelling, or otherwise obtaining, access 
to the private key.44  
II. THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO COMPELLED KEY 
DISCLOSURE 
Encryption technology is a double-edged sword and, as 
such, can be utilized by criminals to shield evidence from 
governments.45 Unlike Great Britain, which has dealt with the 
issue statutorily,46 Congress has thus far declined to pass a 
statute directly addressing the issue of compelled decryption.47 
Thus, the problem has been left to the judiciary, and there it 
has been examined under Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.  
  
functions in which the forward operation can be done easily but the reverse 
operation is so difficult that it is practically impossible. In public key 
cryptography the public key is calculated using private key on the forward 
operation of the one-way function. Obtaining of private key from the public 
key is a reverse operation. If the reverse operation can be done easily, that is 
if the private key is obtained from the public key and other public data, then 
the public key algorithm for the particular key is cracked. The reverse 
operation gets difficult as the key size increases. 
Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.  
 45 See supra note 6. 
 46 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act was passed in 2000. 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, §§ 49-56. 
 47 Congress had an opportunity to address the issue of compelled decryption 
in the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”). 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001-1010 (2006). The only section that references encryption merely states that 
telecommunications providers will not be responsible for decrypting any encrypted 
information that happens to moving over its lines. Id. § 1002(b)(3) (“A 
telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the 
government’s ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by a subscriber or 
customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses 
the information necessary to decrypt the communication.”). Therefore, unlike its 
British counterpart, CALEA does not contain any language compelling individuals to 
decrypt their encrypted data. See generally RIPA, 2000, ch. 23 (Eng.). 
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A. Fifth Amendment Analysis 
The first federal case to directly touch upon the issue of 
compelled decryption is In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher, 
handed down in the Federal District Court of Vermont on 
November 29th, 2007.48 In Boucher, Magistrate Judge Jerome 
J. Niedermeier held that the act of being compelled to turn over 
an encryption password has testimonial aspects.49 As a result, 
the defendant was allowed to refuse to surrender his password 
under protection of the Fifth Amendment right to refrain from 
testimonial self-incrimination.50 This case forms the basis of the 
American approach to compelled decryption under Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
Early American legislators were so opposed to the 
ancient English system, in which admissions of guilt won 
under torture were admissible, that they made the right 
against self-incrimination a cornerstone of the Bill of Rights.51 
  
 48 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher I), No. 2:06-mj-91, 
2007 WL 4246473 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. 
Feb. 19, 2009). 
 49 Id. at *3. 
 50 Id. at *3-4. The holding of Boucher was reversed on narrow grounds by the 
District Court of Vermont. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher II), No. 
2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *3-4 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). Judge William K. Sessions 
reversed Judge Niedermeier’s opinion on the grounds that the foregone conclusion 
doctrine precluded the use of Fifth Amendment protection. Id. As discussed later, in 
being forced to turn over a password, a defendant makes three implicit assertions 
which may be incriminating: that the sought after files exist, that they are authentic, 
and that the defendant has control over the files. See infra text accompanying notes 64-
65. When the government is already aware of these three facts, a defendant is not able 
to seek refuge in the Fifth Amendment because the incriminating information that 
would be produced is a foregone conclusion. See infra text accompanying notes 104-105. 
  In Boucher, when Sebastien Boucher came over the border, his hard drive 
was unencrypted and government agents were able to view the files, thus learning of 
the existence of the purported child pornography. Boucher II, 2009 WL 424718, at *3-4. 
Further, in admitting that the computer was his, Boucher communicated to the 
government that the files were under his control and authentic. Id. at *4. Thus, the 
implicit assertions were foregone conclusions, and Judge Sessions ordered Boucher to 
comply with the order. Id.  
  This reversal does not alter the fundamental analysis presented here. It is 
easy to imagine a situation where the existence, authenticity, and control over a file or 
files were not a foregone conclusion. For example, the government could raid the 
headquarters of a criminal enterprise and find several encrypted hard drives. Because 
the hard drives were encrypted and the government never had initial access, a 
defendant ordered to turn over the password to these hard drives could potentially 
refuse to comply under the Fifth Amendment because the foregone conclusion doctrine 
would not apply. 
 51 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896) (“So deeply did the 
iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American 
colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an 
accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England 
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The Fifth Amendment states, “No person shall . . . be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”52 This 
right against self-incrimination is not, however, absolute. In 
order for Fifth Amendment protection to attach, three 
prerequisites must be met: (1) the disclosure must be 
testimonial,53 (2) the disclosure must be compelled,54 and (3) it 
must be possible that criminal liability could result.55 In the 
vast majority of criminal cases where the government is 
seeking an encryption key or password, that disclosure is being 
compelled and criminal liability could result, thus typically 
leaving only the question of whether disclosing the encryption 
key is testimonial in nature.56  
A communication is considered testimonial when it 
“explicitly or implicitly, relate[s] a factual assertion or 
disclose[s] information.”57 Conversely, the Supreme Court has 
held that a communication is non-testimonial when the suspect 
is “not required ‘to disclose any knowledge he might have,’ or 
  
was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of 
a constitutional enactment.”). 
 52 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 53 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“Fifth Amendment . . . 
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that 
is incriminating.” (second emphasis added)). 
 54 Id. at 409 (“A subpoena served on a [person] requiring him to produce 
[documents] in his possession without doubt involves substantial compulsion.”); see 
also Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (“Subpoenas require compliance and therefore 
constitute compulsion.”). 
 55 Generally, Fifth Amendment protection does not attach unless there is the 
possibility that criminal sanctions could result. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408 (“Fifth 
Amendment . . . applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial 
communication that is incriminating.”). Hence, if a suspect is granted complete 
immunity, he cannot seek refuge in the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Rose, 806 
F.2d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The federal grant of use immunity is sufficient to 
overcome the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”). More 
specifically, as a matter of common sense, encrypted information being sought by the 
government in its investigative capacity will likely be incriminating. In Boucher, the 
judge noted, “Because the files sought by the government allegedly contain child 
pornography, the entry of the password would be incriminating.” Boucher I, 2007 WL 
4246473, at *2.  
 56 See Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2. Generally, the plaintext which is 
hidden by the encryption would not be protected by the Fifth Amendment, because in 
most cases such plaintext would be voluntarily prepared, and thus would not be a 
testimonial statement afforded protection under the Fifth Amendment. Reitinger, 
supra note 21, at 178 (“[I]f law enforcement subpoenas information that I have 
encrypted, I must produce the information in plaintext if it remains available to me in 
that form, assuming I have no other proper objection, such as my privilege against self-
incrimination”). 
 57 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988). 
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‘to speak his guilt.’”58 There are a number of compelled 
disclosures that are non-testimonial and thus do not violate the 
Fifth Amendment, including taking blood samples, taking 
fingerprints, taking voice and handwriting exemplars, 
compelling someone to wear particular clothing, and forcing 
someone to stand in a lineup.59 
Typically, the contents of a document or hard drive will 
not be protected by the Fifth Amendment.60 Nevertheless, in 
certain circumstances the very act of turning over a document 
or providing a password to an encrypted hard drive will 
implicitly communicate incriminating facts and hence will be 
protected.61 In Fisher v. United States, the government sought 
to compel the production of certain incriminating documents, 
and the defendant refused to comply on the grounds that the 
act of producing the documents would constitute self-
incrimination.62 Although the documents themselves were 
voluntarily prepared and were therefore not protected, the 
defendants argued that the act of production implicitly 
asserted incriminating facts and should be protected by the 
Fifth Amendment.63 Justice White’s majority opinion for the 
Supreme Court held that complying with a subpoena to 
produce documents could implicitly communicate three facts: 
that the documents exist,64 that they are in the control of the 
accused, and that the papers are authentic.65 This is sometimes 
referred to as the “act of production doctrine.”66 Applying this 
  
 58 Id. at 210 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967); see 
also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (“[T]he prohibition of compelling a man 
in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical 
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body 
as evidence when it may be material.”). 
 59 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. at 210. 
 60 Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2. 
 61 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984). 
 62 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-12 (1976). 
 63 Id. at 410-11. 
 64 The first element, that the documents actually exist, is interesting with 
regard to encryption software programs, such as TrueCrypt, which specifically market 
the ability to hide even the fact that the encrypted files even exist within the 
ciphertext. TrueCrypt, Plausible Deniability, Hidden Volume, http://www.truecrypt. 
org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).  
 65 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (“Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes 
the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. 
It also would indicate the taxpayer’s belief that the papers are those described in the 
subpoena.”); see also Clemens, supra note 27, at 11-12 (discussing the application of the 
three Fisher prongs to encryption key disclosure). 
 66 See Reitinger, supra note 21, at 180. Notably, turning over an encryption 
password would not be explicitly incriminating, unless the password itself 
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doctrine to compelled decryption, it can be argued that being 
forced to turn over a password would implicitly communicate 
that the electronic files that the government is seeking exist, 
that the defendant actually has control over and access to the 
files, and that the electronic files are authentic. This is the 
defense that Sebastien Boucher raised when the government 
attempted to compel him to turn over his password in 
Boucher.67 
Nevertheless, the government may be able to draft a 
subpoena compelling disclosure in a manner such that the 
testimonial aspects of the act of production are not implicated. 
In such circumstances, the protection against self 
incrimination would not attach and the defendant would be left 
no recourse save compliance. This was the case in Doe v. 
United States.68 There, the government subpoenaed bank 
records for several accounts in the Cayman Islands and 
Bermuda.69 The unnamed defendant failed to respond to the 
subpoena, and so the government attempted to force the 
defendant to sign a number of release forms that would allow 
the banks to turn over the records.70 The defendant claimed 
Fifth Amendment protection.71 The Supreme Court held that 
the forms the defendant was asked to sign spoke only in the 
hypothetical, and, that because of the non-specific way in which 
they were drafted, signing them did not acknowledge the 
existence of, or control over, any account, or communicate the 
authenticity of any records.72 Thus, the three implicit assertions 
about which the Fisher Court was concerned were not 
implicated, and the defendant was not entitled to Fifth 
Amendment protection. 
  
communicated some incriminating fact, for example, if, in a child pornography case, the 
password was “iluvyoungkidz.” 
 67 In re Boucher (Boucher I), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *3 (D. Vt. 
Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 68 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 218 (1988). 
 69 Id. at 202-03. 
 70 Id. at 203. 
 71 Id. at 203-04. 
 72 Id. at 215-16 (“It is carefully drafted not to make reference to a specific 
account, but only to speak in the hypothetical. Thus, the form does not acknowledge 
that an account in a foreign financial institution is in existence or that it is controlled 
by petitioner. . . . Nor would his execution of the form admit the authenticity of any 
records produced by the bank.”). 
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B. In re Boucher 
Boucher is the first case to apply this Fifth Amendment 
logic to the issue of compelled decryption. On December 17, 
2006, while crossing the border from Canada into the United 
States at the town of Derby Line, Vermont, Sebastian 
Boucher’s car was pulled over and inspected by Customs and 
Border Protection agent Chris Pike.73 While performing the 
inspection, Officer Pike noticed a laptop in the back seat, 
opened it, and was able to access the hard drive without 
entering a password.74 After investigating the computer’s 
contents, Officer Pike located approximately 40,000 images, 
some of which appeared to be pornographic.75 When asked if 
any of the images contained child pornography, Boucher 
responded that he was not sure.76 After discovering several file 
names that appeared to reference child pornography, Officer 
Pike called in Special Agent Mark Curtis of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement.77 During the course of his investigation, 
Agent Curtis found a file, entitled “2yo getting raped during 
diaper change.”78 Although Agent Curtis could tell that the file 
had been recently opened, he was unable to open it at that 
time.79 
Boucher was then arrested and subsequently waived his 
Miranda rights.80 When asked about the aforementioned file, 
  
 73 In re Boucher (Boucher I), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *1 (D. Vt. 
Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 74 Id. A reason that the officer may not have had to enter a password is that 
with most encryption software, when you simply close your laptop, thereby putting it to 
“sleep,” instead of actually shutting it down, the encrypted drive will remain accessible 
without re-entering the password (“mounted”). See TrueCrypt, FAQ, 
http://www.truecrypt.org/faq.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2009) (“TrueCrypt automatically 
dismounts all mounted TrueCrypt volumes on system shutdown/restart.”). Once the 
computer is shut down, the encrypted drive is dismounted and cannot be accessed 
again without entering the password. Id. 
 75 Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *1. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. The purpose of Miranda rights is to counteract the inherently coercive 
nature of custodial interrogation and protect the privilege against self incrimination. 
See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). “[T]he [suspect] must be 
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be 
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, 
either retained or appointed.” Id. Here, Boucher waived his Miranda rights so the 
police were allowed to interrogate him without counsel present. Boucher I, 2007 WL 
4246473, at *1. However, the Fifth Amendment can be invoked at anytime, so even 
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Boucher said that, because he downloaded many pornographic 
images, sometimes he would “unknowingly” download child 
pornography.81 When he discovered the child pornography, 
Boucher claimed he would immediately delete the images.82 
Boucher then showed Agent Curtis the drive (“drive Z”) on 
which he downloaded the pornography, and Agent Curtis 
discovered several “images and videos of child pornography in 
drive Z.”83 The laptop was shut down and seized.84  
On December 29, 2006, Mike Touchette of the Vermont 
Department of Corrections restarted Boucher’s computer, and 
made a mirror image copy of its hard drive.85 However, 
Touchette was then unable to access drive Z because it had 
been encrypted using a software program named Pretty Good 
Privacy (“PGP”).86 In fact, because of this encryption, the 
government has not been able to view any of the files on drive Z 
since December 17, 2006, the day the laptop was seized.87 In an 
attempt to gain access to the files, the government obtained a 
grand jury subpoena for the production of “all documents, 
whether in electronic or paper form, reflecting any passwords 
used or associated with the Alienware Notebook Computer . . . 
seized from Sebastien Boucher at the Port of Entry at Derby 
Line, Vermont on December 17, 2006.”88 Boucher motioned to 
quash the subpoena, claiming that the act of turning over the 
password violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.89 
In addressing the motion, Judge Niedermeier began his 
analysis with the conclusion that, because the subpoena sought 
to compel Boucher to enter his key for the purposes of 
subjecting Boucher to criminal liability, the self-incrimination 
issue turned entirely on whether this act was testimonial in 
nature.90 He determined that entering the password “implicitly 
  
though Boucher initially waived his rights, he is permitted to subsequently claim them 
at any later time. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
 81 Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *1. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See supra Part I.B. 
 88 Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (emphasis added). 
 89 Id. See generally Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
 90 See Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (“Because the files sought by the 
government allegedly contain child pornography, the entry of the password would be 
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communicates facts,” and that if Boucher was forced to comply, 
he would “be faced with the forbidden trilemma; incriminate 
himself, lie under oath, or find himself in contempt of court.”91 
Judge Niedermeier rejected the government’s argument that, 
like signing the non-specific release forms at issue in Doe, the 
act of entering the password was non-testimonial.92 He 
distinguished the two cases on the grounds that, in Doe, the 
Court found that no implicit facts would be communicated due 
to the artful drafting of the release form, whereas in the 
present case, entering the password would implicitly 
communicate that Mr. Boucher had access to the files.93 
According to Judge Niedermeier, in Doe, “the suspect was 
compelled to act to obtain access without indicating that he 
believed himself to have access. Here, when Boucher enters a 
password he indicates that he believes he has access.”94  
In an attempt to avoid a Fifth Amendment challenge, 
the government offered immunity specifically with regards to 
the act of producing the password, as opposed to immunity for 
any child pornography charge.95 The government argued that a 
grant of immunity would permit compelled disclosure because 
the Fifth Amendment does not protect communications for 
which no criminal liability could result.96 The Supreme Court 
passed on a similar government tactic in United States v. 
Hubbell.97 There, the government subpoenaed documents from 
the defendant, and they were supplied after immunity was 
granted solely for the act of production.98 After the defendant 
turned over the documents, the government sought to use them 
against him in an unrelated tax case.99 The Supreme Court 
  
incriminating. Whether the privilege against self incrimination applies therefore 
depends on whether the subpoena seeks testimonial communication.”).  
 91 Id. at *3 (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988)). 
 92 Id. 
 93 See id. at *4. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. The government was attempting to only grant use, and not derivative 
use, immunity. A grant of both “use” and “derivative use” immunity prevents the 
government from using a particular piece of the suspect’s testimony against him, and 
from using any evidence which is derived only from that particular testimony. 22 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law § 98 (2009). In any event, use or derivative use immunity “is not full 
immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, 
[as it] allows . . . a prosecution using evidence from legitimate independent sources.” Id. 
(citations and footnotes omitted). 
 96 See Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *4. 
 97 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
 98 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 31 (2000). 
 99 Id. at 31-32. 
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rejected this tactic, holding that the grant of immunity for the 
production of the documents included immunity for any 
information that was derived from that act of production.100 
Similarly, in Boucher, “the government offered not to 
use the production of the password against Boucher,” and thus, 
in their eyes, “remove[d] the testimonial aspect from the” 
disclosure.101 Judge Niedermeier disagreed and, relying on 
Hubbell, stated that the “testimonial aspect of the entry of the 
password precludes the use of the files themselves as derivative 
of the compelled testimony.”102 Thus, Judge Niedermeier 
concluded that the government’s offer of immunity for the act 
of production was unavailing because obtaining the plaintext 
would be a derivative use of the compelled act.103 Under the 
court’s reasoning, immunizing a person solely for the act of 
typing in his encryption password would prevent the 
government from using the derivatively acquired plaintext in a 
criminal trial against him. 
The government also argued that it should have access 
to the files under the “foregone conclusion” doctrine.104 Under 
this doctrine, if the government is already aware of the 
existence and location of a particular document or file, and if 
producing the document or file would not “implicitly 
authenticate” it, then any evidence gained would be a foregone 
conclusion, and the suspect would not be entitled to Fifth 
Amendment protection.105 Simply restated, if the act of 
production would not implicitly communicate the three Fisher 
elements because the government already could prove each of 
them, then the three assertions would be a foregone conclusion 
and Fifth Amendment protection would not attach. In Boucher, 
the government argued that because its agents were able to 
access drive Z and view child pornography before the computer 
was shutdown, it already knew the location and existence of at 
least some child pornography on Boucher’s laptop and, thus, 
the foregone conclusion doctrine applied.106 
  
 100 Id. at 40. 
 101 Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *4. 
 102 Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at *5-6. This is the argument Judge Sessions seized upon in reversing 
Boucher I. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 105 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 
87, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
 106 See Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *5-6. 
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Judge Niedermeier disagreed. With regard to turning 
over the files, he wrote that the government only knew the 
location of a couple of files, and that there was a lot of 
information on drive Z about which the government had no 
knowledge.107 Because “the files the government has not seen 
could add much to the sum total of the government’s 
information,” Judge Niedermeier held that “the foregone 
conclusion doctrine [did] not apply.”108 With regard to solely 
turning over the password, Judge Niedermeier argued that 
“[t]he foregone conclusion doctrine does not apply to the 
production of non-physical evidence, existing only in a suspect’s 
mind where the act of production can be used against him.”109  
In reversing Judge Niedermeier’s holding, Judge 
Sessions seized upon the foregone conclusion doctrine and held 
that, because government agents were able to view the files 
before they were encrypted, and because Boucher admitted the 
laptop was his, the foregone conclusion doctrine did, in fact, 
apply.110 Thus, Boucher was directed to comply with the order 
and turn over an unencrypted version of the Z drive.111 
Regardless, it is easy to imagine a scenario in which the 
foregone conclusion would not apply. For example, if agents 
seized an encrypted computer, but they were not sure if it 
belonged to a particular suspect, they would never have had 
access to the encrypted files, and they could not prove it was 
under the suspect’s control. In such a situation, it is likely that 
the foregone conclusion doctrine would not apply, and a 
defendant could seek refuge in the Fifth Amendment.  
Ultimately, Judge Niedermeier’s opinion in Boucher 
exemplifies the American approach to the dilemma posed by 
powerful encryption: the idea that compelled password 
disclosure can have Fisher-like testimonial aspects, and thus 
Fifth Amendment protection can, in certain circumstances, be 
invoked to avoid compliance with a governmental order to turn 
over a password.  
  
 107 Id. at *6. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher (Boucher II), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 
WL 424718, at *3-4 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); see also supra note 50 and accompanying 
text. At least one commentator presaged this holding. See Posting of Orin Kerr to The 
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com (Dec. 19, 2007, 16:38). 
 111 Boucher II, 2009 WL 424718, at *4. 
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III. THE BRITISH APPROACH TO COMPELLED KEY 
DISCLOSURE 
Great Britain is one of the most heavily surveilled 
countries on the planet.112 In 2006, there were an estimated 4.2 
million closed circuit televisions in Britain, meaning there was 
roughly one surveillance camera for every fourteen people.113 In 
light of the this, it is not surprising that, contrary to the 
American legislative avoidance of the issue, Great Britain 
enacted a statute which expressly permits the government to 
compel decryption.114 This statute, the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (“RIPA”), empowers certain 
governmental actors, like the judiciary, high-level police, 
customs and excise officials, and military officers to compel 
decryption by threat of imprisonment and fines for 
noncompliance.115  
A. Background of RIPA 
As a member of the Council of Europe,116 the United 
Kingdom and its laws are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”).117 In 1997, the 
ECHR held that Britain’s then-applicable law on the 
interception of communications violated the European Human 
Rights Convention because it did not address “interceptions 
carried out over private communication networks.”118 In 
response, Great Britain passed the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act (“RIPA”).119 RIPA was designed not only to comply 
with the ECHR decision, but also to address the rapid growth 
  
 112 See Britain is ‘Surveillance Society,’ BBC NEWS, Nov. 2, 2006, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6108496.stm. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, ch. 23 (Eng.). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Tarik Abdel-Monem, Precedent of the European Convention on Human 
Rights to the CIA’s High Value Detainees Program in and Through Europe, 31 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 45, 52 n.38 (2007). 
 117 European Court of Human Rights, How the Execution of Judgment Works, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/Execution/How+the+execution+o
f+judgments+wo-rks/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2009) (“The [parties] to the European 
Convention on Human Rights have committed themselves to secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention and, in 
this respect, have undertaken to ‘abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case 
to which they are parties.’”). 
 118 Yeates, supra note 10, at 133.  
 119 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23. 
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of communications technology and the fervent desire of 
government officials to ensure that police agencies were able to 
keep up with this shifting landscape.120 
The preamble of RIPA identifies the purposes of the Act, 
and specifically singles out encryption as a primary focus: 
An Act to make provision for and about the interception of 
communications, the acquisition and disclosure of data relating to 
communications, the carrying out of surveillance, the use of covert 
human intelligence sources and the acquisition of the means by 
which electronic data protected by encryption or passwords may be 
decrypted or accessed . . . .121 
RIPA was passed by Parliament in 2000, and Part III of 
the Act, which addresses forced decryption, was put into effect 
in October of 2007.122 
B. RIPA 
1. Section 49 
Part III of RIPA is entitled “Investigation of Electronic 
Data Protected by Encryption etc.”123 The statute lays out 
several important definitions. First, it defines a key as “any 
key, code, password, algorithm or other data the use of which 
(with or without other keys) . . . (a) allows access to the 
electronic data, or (b) facilitates the putting of the data into an 
intelligible form.”124 Protected information is “any electronic 
data which, without the key to the data . . . (a) cannot, or 
cannot readily, be accessed, or (b) cannot, or cannot readily, be 
put into an intelligible form.”125 Lastly, rendering a document 
into intelligible form requires putting the document “in the 
condition in which it was before an encryption or similar 
process was applied to it.”126  
Section 49 of Part III governs the conditions under 
which the British government is permitted to compel citizens to 
  
 120 Yeates, supra note 10, at 134-38 (discussing in more depth the 
technological changes that led to the passage of both CALEA and the RIPA). 
 121 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, §§ 49-56 (emphasis added). 
 122 Jeremy Kirk, Contested UK Encryption Disclosure Law Takes Effect, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2007/10/01/AR2007100100511.html. 
 123 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, §§ 49-56. 
 124 Id. § 56(1). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. § 56(3). 
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turn over the plaintext of the requested encrypted documents.127 
Accordingly, the orders which the government employs to 
compel disclosure are known as “Section 49 Notices.”128 Notably, 
turning over the plaintext of an encrypted document is 
tantamount to divulging the encryption password because, if 
one is being forced to turn over the plaintext, one must enter 
the password against his will.129  
Section 49 first requires that the ciphertext be obtained 
in a lawful manner.130 There are several enumerated examples 
of how this can be done.131 The two most prominent are when 
information has come into a government agent’s possession 
either by “means of the exercise of a statutory power to seize, 
detain, inspect, search,” or “by means of the exercise of any 
statutory power to intercept communications.”132 This includes 
the common situation in which information is seized pursuant 
to a judicial warrant.133 The requirement to obtain the 
ciphertext in a lawful manner is important because it means 
that the British government is not permitted to compel 
decryption unless it has obtained possession of the encrypted 
information lawfully.134 For example, if a police officer seized a 
computer without a valid warrant, the government would not 
have lawful possession of that computer, and thus could not 
compel plaintext disclosure.  
In the ordinary case, a law enforcement agency will 
receive permission to issue a Section 49 notice from an official 
with the appropriate authorization, then serve the notice upon 
the target of the investigation. The recipient, in turn, must 
  
 127 Id. § 49. 
 128 See Home Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, Encryption, 
Disclosure of Keys, http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/encryption/disclosure-of-keys/ 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2009). 
 129 Additionally, there is a section in Part III which empowers the government 
to require that the key itself be turned over. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 
ch. 23, § 51. The British government is more reluctant to compel disclosure of the 
actual key when the plaintext will suffice so it adds several extra burdens that must be 
met in order compel key disclosure as compared to plaintext disclosure. See 
Explanatory Notes to Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ¶ 272 (2000) [hereinafter 
Explanatory Notes]. 
 130 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 49(1); see also 
Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 256. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. § 49(1)(a)-(b).  
 133 Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 256. 
 134 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 49(1)(a)-(e). 
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hand over the requested plaintext within a reasonable amount 
of time.135 Failure to comply is a crime.136  
Subsection (2) of Section 49 places certain limiting 
factors on the ability of the government to compel decryption, 
and also references Schedule 2, which describes the 
governmental actors that have the authority to compel 
decryption.137 First, the key must be in the possession of the 
person on whom the notice is being served.138 Second, decryption 
can be compelled only if there is a specifically enumerated 
justification for doing so139 (the acceptable justifications are 
delineated in subsection (3), discussed in the next paragraph).140 
Third, the “imposition of such [compelled disclosure must be] 
proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by its 
imposition.”141 Thus, the statute implements a balancing test in 
which the governmental interest in obtaining the plaintext 
must be equal to or greater than the interests of the individual 
seeking to prevent compelled decryption. Finally, it must not be 
“reasonably practicable” for the government agent to obtain the 
plaintext without such compulsion.142 Thus, for example, if the 
encryption is very weak and could be easily deciphered, or if 
the password is written down on a piece of paper whose 
location is known to the police, compelled decryption would not 
be appropriate because it would be reasonable to acquire the 
plaintext by other means.143 This has the effect of making 
compelled disclosure a last resort. 
Subsection (3) of Section 49 delineates the three specific 
justifications for compelled key disclosure.144 Under this 
subsection, plaintext disclosure can be compelled only “in the 
interests of national security,” “for the purpose of preventing or 
detecting crime,” or “in the interests of the economic well-being 
of the United Kingdom.”145  
  
 135 See Home Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, supra note 128. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 49(2). 
 138 Id. § 49(2)(a); see also Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 257. 
 139 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 49(2)(b). 
 140 Id. § 49(3). 
 141 Id. § 49(2)(c). 
 142 Id. § 49(2)(d). 
 143 See id. 
 144 Id. § 49(3). 
 145 Id. 
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2. Schedule 2 
Schedule 2 of RIPA addresses who is allowed to 
authorize compelled disclosure. First, in order to compel 
plaintext disclosure, one must have appropriate written 
permission from a judge, unless one of the statutory exceptions 
applies.146 These exceptions are laid out in Paragraphs 2 
through 5 of Schedule 2, which also discuss the level of 
authority required to grant permission to force plaintext 
disclosure. Importantly, the level of authority “varies 
depending on the powers under which [the] unintelligible 
information . . . is likely to be obtained.”147 As a result, the 
statute allows for non-judicial governmental actors to authorize 
compelled decryption.  
Under Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 (“Data obtained under 
a warrant etc”), a government officer may serve a notice 
compelling plaintext disclosure if he or she obtained 
unintelligible information pursuant to a warrant issued by “the 
Secretary of State or a person holding judicial office,”148 so long 
as the officer was given authorization to do so either in the 
warrant itself, or subsequently.149 Paragraph 2 specifically 
excludes from compelled disclosure any encrypted information 
that was seized without a warrant.150 
Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 (“Data obtained 
by the intelligence services under statute but without a 
warrant”), where an intelligence service comes into possession 
of unintelligible information151 in the course of lawful 
surveillance but without a warrant, the intelligence service can 
issue a notice compelling disclosure of the plaintext if it has 
written permission from the Secretary of State.152 In these 
instances, there is no requirement of prior judicial approval. 
Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 (“Data obtained under 
statute by other persons but without a warrant”) covers 
situations when a government agency other than the 
intelligence services comes into the possession of encrypted 
information which was not obtained pursuant to a warrant, but 
  
 146 Id. sched. 2, ¶ 1(1). 
 147 Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 357. 
 148 Id. at ¶ 360. 
 149 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, sched. 2, ¶ 2(2). 
 150 Id. ¶ 2(9).  
 151 Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 366. Unintelligible information 
refers to encrypted data. 
 152 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, sched. 2, ¶ 3(2). 
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was acquired legally pursuant to statutory power.153 In such 
situations, the high ranking members of these agencies154 may 
grant permission to compel plaintext disclosure.155 To compel 
disclosure, a police officer must be of at least the rank of 
superintendent to give such permission, with some 
exceptions.156 With regard to Customs and Excise, the official 
must be the Commissioner of Customs and Excise, or above a 
lesser rank set by the Commissioner.157 Finally, for the military, 
the officer must be above the rank of lieutenant colonel, or 
above a rank set by a lieutenant colonel.158  
Similarly, Paragraph 5 (“Data obtained without the 
exercise of statutory powers”) grants the aforementioned 
officials the power to authorize compelled disclosure where the 
encrypted information has come into the hands of the police, 
Customs and Excise, or an intelligence service lawfully, but not 
via their respective statutory powers—i.e., if it was voluntarily 
handed over.159 Thus, when encrypted information is seized 
pursuant to the statutory power of one of the enumerated 
agencies, there is no requirement of judicial oversight for 
compelled disclosure. 
3. Section 50 
Section 50 discusses some of the formalities that 
accompany receiving a Section 49 notice. Under this section, 
recipients of an order to compel disclosure are given the option 
to turn over the encryption key instead of the requested 
plaintext.160 Moreover, Subsection (8) of Section 50 requires a 
person no longer in possession of the key to provide information 
that could help law enforcement gain possession of it.161 
  
 153 Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 368. 
 154 The agencies are the police, Customs and Excise, and the military. Id. ¶ 369. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, sched. 2, ¶ 6(3) (concerning 
information that has come into the police’s hands through the exercise of power of 
section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 or section 13A or 13B of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act of 1989). 
 157 Id. ¶ 6(4). 
 158 Id. ¶ 6(5). 
 159 Id. ¶ 5; see also Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 371. 
 160 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 50(1)-(2) (“A person 
subject to a requirement [of disclosing plaintext] . . . shall be taken to have complied 
with that requirement if . . . he makes, instead, a disclosure of any key to the protected 
information that is in his possession.” (emphasis added)). 
 161 Id. § 50(8). 
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4. Section 51 
Section 51 addresses the situation where the 
government specifically wants the encryption key, instead of 
merely the plaintext.162 In such a case, Section 51 requires that 
the government satisfy several extra burdens.163 First, a 
government official may only require disclosure of the actual 
key when “special circumstances” exist such that the purpose of 
the disclosure, to get the plaintext, would be defeated without 
obtaining the actual key.164 Second, the official must balance the 
imposition of compelling the disclosure of the key against two 
factors: (1) the risk that other private information, not 
including that which the government is specifically seeking, 
may be turned over; and (2) the risk that compelled disclosure 
might have an adverse effect on the business of the person 
being compelled.165  
5. Section 53 
In Section 53, RIPA criminalizes failure to comply with 
these disclosure requirements166: it is a crime to “knowingly 
fail[] . . . to make the disclosure required” by a Section 49 
notice.167 The punishment resulting from a conviction is up to 
two years imprisonment, a fine, or both.168  
There are several affirmative defenses to this crime. 
First, an individual who fails to comply with a Section 49 notice 
can demonstrate that he could not have complied with the 
disclosure requirement in the time required, and that he did 
comply as soon as it was reasonable to do so.169 Second, an 
individual can argue that he was not actually in possession of 
the key.170 If an individual is able to raise an issue of fact with 
regard to this second defense, the burden then shifts to the 
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he does 
indeed have possession of the key.171 Thus, the government can 
  
 162 Id. § 51. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. § 51(4). 
 165 Id. § 51(5)(b). 
 166 Id. § 53-54. 
 167 Id. § 53(1). 
 168 Id. § 53(5)(a). 
 169 Id. § 53(4); see also Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 283. 
 170 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 53(3). 
 171 Id. § 53(3)(b). 
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only prosecute under Section 53 if it has successfully proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is in possession of 
the encryption key.172  
6. Section 54 
Under Section 54, RIPA also criminalizes “tipping off.”173 
This refers to the notion that, in some situations, a Section 49 
notice will include a requirement that the recipient of the 
notice keep its delivery and its contents secret.174 A Section 49 
notice may contain such a secrecy requirement only when the 
encrypted information has come into the possession of the 
police “by means which it is reasonable, in order to maintain 
the effectiveness of any investigation . . . , or in the interests of 
the safety or well-being of any person, to keep secret from a 
particular person.”175 Therefore, where the authorities can 
articulate a reason why their investigation would be hampered 
by disclosing the fact that they had served a Section 49 notice, 
they can include what amounts to a gag order.176 When the 
recipient of such a Section 49 notice “tips off” another person to 
the fact that he received the notice, or discloses the contents of 
the notice to another person, he can be subject to criminal 
liability.177 A person convicted of this “tipping off” offense will be 
subject to “imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or 
to a fine, or to both.”178 
Section 54 also includes a number of affirmative 
defenses. These include: when the tipping off was the result of 
software which automatically informed other people that the 
encryption key was compromised,179 when the disclosure is 
made to legal counsel in a conversation about one’s options 
under Part III of RIPA,180 when the disclosure is made to 
persons within an organization so that they can comply with 
  
 172 Id. § 53.  
 173 Id. § 54 (Eng.); see also Explanatory Notes, supra note 129, ¶ 285. 
 174 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 54(1). 
 175 Id. § 54(3). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. § 54(4). 
 178 Id. § 54(4)(a). 
 179 Id. § 54(5). 
 180 Id. § 54(6)-(7). 
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the notice,181 and when a person is told about a notice but does 
not know that there was a secrecy requirement.182 
In contrast to the prospective American system, officers 
of the British government are thus empowered to compel 
decryption without so much as prior approval of a member of 
the judiciary. This system lends a powerful tool in the 
burgeoning war against modern criminals.  
IV. CRITICISMS AND A MIDDLE GROUND  
America and Great Britain have approached the 
dilemma posed by powerful encryption in vastly different 
manners. Each resides at one end of a continuum between 
providing adequate protection of civil rights and ensuring the 
effectiveness of law enforcement. The American approach 
favors the protection of civil liberties, while the British 
approach favors law enforcement interests. Ultimately though, 
each method is fraught with unique problems. Accordingly, 
America should seek to adopt a suitable middle ground that 
draws upon the strengths, and avoids the weaknesses, of both 
approaches. 
A. Criticisms of the American and British Approaches 
The major problem with the American approach, as 
exemplified by Boucher, is that the government’s power to 
investigate and prosecute crimes, especially those of a 
technological nature, will be significantly hampered if 
criminals are able to hide their activities behind a virtually 
unbreakable wall of encryption.183 It is easy to imagine 
nightmare scenarios in which law enforcement efforts are 
thwarted by criminals utilizing powerful encryption. In her 
testimony before the House of Representatives, then U.S. 
Attorney General Janet Reno described three such hypothetical 
situations: terrorists seeking to detonate a bomb in a major city 
using encrypted communications, a child abuser and 
distributor of child pornography encrypting photographs so as 
to hide them from law enforcement, and a computer hacker 
stealing personal financial data and then encrypting his hard 
  
 181 Id. § 54(9). 
 182 Id. § 54(10). 
 183 See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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drive so as to avoid detection and prosecution.184 In each of 
these scenarios, the consequences to the public would be dire if 
the government were unable to access the information it 
needed. 
The principal problem with the American approach is 
that, in the face of widespread encryption, the government 
might be severely hindered in its efforts to investigate and 
prosecute criminal activity. Despite the notion that there are 
some testimonial aspects implicated in forced decryption, 
affording sweeping Fifth Amendment protection to such actions 
would be impractical because of the possibility that 
prosecutions could grind to a halt as a result of widespread 
encryption. Moreover, leaving the issue solely to the judiciary 
might create uncertainty because the rules pertaining to 
compelled decryption could develop in different fashions and at 
different paces in the various jurisdictions confronting the 
issue. This would be detrimental as legitimate users of 
encryption, such as travelling businesspersons would be forced 
to alter their data protection strategies depending on in which 
jurisdiction they were located.  
The British approach, while accounting for the law 
enforcement related problems of the American approach, is 
fraught with problems of its own. Most fundamentally, in an 
attempt to prevent criminals from being able to hide their 
activities behind a wall of encryption, RIPA does not provide 
adequate provisions for the protection of civil liberties.185 
Ultimately, there is very little in the way of safeguards 
standing between the government and the encrypted files it 
seeks. For example, it is not even always necessary to gain 
judicial approval before a Section 49 notice is sent, as 
frequently the approval of a high ranking police, Customs and 
Excise, or military official will suffice.186 According to one 
commentator, RIPA is a “sledgehammer law designed to 
  
 184 Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 
850 Before the H. Armed Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Janet Reno, 
Att’y Gen. of the United States), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony 
/1999/agarmed071399.htm. 
 185 See Police Decryption Powers Flawed, BBC NEWS, Aug. 15, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4794383.stm; RIPA Could Be Challenged on 
Human Rights, OUT-LAW.COM, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.out-law.com//default.aspx? 
page=8826. 
 186 Kirk, supra note 122 (“A Section 49 request must . . . be approved by a 
judicial authority, chief of police, the customs and excise commissioner or a person 
ranking higher than a brigadier or equivalent.”); supra Part III.B.2. 
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support security services at the expense of civil liberties which 
are taken for granted in most of the western world.”187 This 
commentator continues that “Britain does not join the best 
company with [RIPA]—other places to have similar laws 
include Russia and Malaysia.”188  
A further problem with the British approach is the 
inclusion of the gag order provision. Such orders are 
reminiscent of the unsuccessful National Security Letters 
(“NSLs”) which were authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act.189 
NSLs are administrative subpoenas issued by certain 
governmental agencies which require no probable cause or 
judicial oversight.190 They also contained a gag order provision 
similar to Section 54 of RIPA, which forbids the recipient of the 
NSL from disclosing to anyone that he received it.191 The gag 
order provision was held unconstitutional by a judge in the 
Southern District of New York as violative of the First 
Amendment.192 The statute was partially amended by Congress 
in response to this decision and still it was held 
unconstitutional by the same district judge on remand from the 
Second Circuit.193 There was also massive popular outcry in 
America against the NSL gag orders on civil rights grounds.194 
Considering the controversy surrounding the NSL gag orders, 
one could imagine that an analogous gag order section in a 
potential American compelled decryption statute would be met 
with similar dissent. 
RIPA has also faced stiff criticism from those who fear it 
will hurt e-commerce in Great Britain. Their concern is that 
RIPA will drive technology-centered companies out of Great 
Britain and into countries with more legal protections for 
  
 187 Nick McIntosh, Curbing our Right to Online Freedom, GUARDIAN, Apr. 18, 
2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2001/apr/18/news.childprotection/. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom., Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 86, 864 (2d. Cir. 2008). 
 190 Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Frequently Asked Questions: 
National Security Letters, available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/ 
nsl_faqs030907.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2009). 
 191 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006). 
 192 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 526-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 193 Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 425-26. 
 194 See generally Op-Ed, My National Security Letter Gag Order, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 23, 2007, at A17; Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Urges 
Court to Rule National Security Letters Unconstitutional, Mar. 20, 2008, 
http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2008/03/20; Challenge to the “National Security 
Letter” Authority, ACLU, available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/patriot/17458res 
20040929.html (last visited June 13, 2009). 
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encryption.195 In fact, after the passage of RIPA, Ireland passed 
a law which specifically made it clear that the Irish 
government would not be permitted to compel key disclosure.196 
An independent report prepared for the British Chambers of 
Commerce on the economic impact of RIPA stated:  
As it stands, RIP[A] is likely to create a legal environment which will 
inhibit investment, impede the evolution of e-commerce, impose 
direct and indirect costs on business and the consumer, diminish 
overall trust in e-commerce, disrupt business-to-business 
relationships, place UK companies at a competitive disadvantage, 
and create a range of legal uncertainties that will place a growing 
number of businesses in a precarious position.197 
Critics have also criticized the criticized the perverse 
incentives and harsh operation of the statute. They stress that 
the purported principal targets of Part III—terrorists and 
purveyors of child pornography—would likely take the two or 
five year sentence resulting from nondisclosure rather than 
face what would assuredly be a much longer sentence if the 
data was decrypted and their crimes were revealed.198 Further, 
critics argue that a person served with a Section 49 notice 
could legitimately have forgotten the requested encryption key, 
and could be subject to a two year sentence for nothing more 
than absentmindedness.199  
Lastly, a structural problem with RIPA is that there are 
software programs which foresee the possibility that one could 
  
 195 See Yeates, supra note 10, at 153 (“Substantial apprehension exists in 
Britain as to whether the RIPA will blunt the growing U.K. e-economy . . . . 
[N]umerous critics bitterly pointed out the contrast between Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s stated desire to make the U.K. the friendliest place in the world for e-commerce 
and the perceived negative impact of the RIPA on e-commerce.”); see also Victor 
Keegan, Op-Ed, Internet Monitoring ‘Time Bomb’ for E-commerce, THE GUARDIAN, June 
13, 2000, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2000/jun/13/freespeech.internet 
(“[RIPA] will produce one of the most draconian regimes in the world driving e-
commerce to safer havens like Ireland and most countries in Europe.”). 
 196 See Yeates, supra note 10, at 153. The Irish Electric Commerce Bill states, 
“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring the disclosure or enabling the 
seizure of unique data, such as codes, passwords, algorithms, private cryptographic 
keys, or other data, that may be necessary to render information or an electronic 
communication intelligible.” Electronic Commerce Act, 2000 (Act No. 27/2000) § 28 (Ir.) 
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2000/en/act/pub/0027/sec0028.html. 
 197 BRITISH CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE 
REGULATION OF INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL (2000). 
 198 Julian Glover & Patrick Barkham, The RIP Act, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 
2000, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/oct/24/qanda (“[D]rug 
smugglers and paedophiles [sic] would happily settle for a two-year prison sentence 
rather than face far harsher penalties for being found guilty of the crime they are 
suspected of.”). 
 199 Id. 
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be forced to turn over a password and plan for this eventuality 
by allowing one to create a false “secret” location that is 
accessed by a dummy password. TrueCrypt, one such 
encryption software program, has a function which allows a 
user to set up a section of the encrypted portion of a hard drive 
that contains some files, but not the ones actually meant to be 
kept secret.200 A different password or passphrase accesses this 
false drive and TrueCrypt recommends that the user store 
some files in this section that appear sensitive but that can 
become public.201 Under such a set-up, when compelled, the user 
can give the authorities the password to this false location. 
This allows him to seemingly comply with the compulsion 
order, but still keep his real secret files hidden.202  
B. Middle Ground 
To alleviate these problems, America must seek a 
middle ground between the current American approach and the 
British approach. Such a middle ground would be well served 
by incorporating the unique strengths of each approach, and 
avoiding some of their pitfalls.  
Leaving the issue solely to the judiciary on a case by 
case basis would likely create uncertainty and leave the 
government ill-equipped to gain the plaintext they need to 
prosecute violations of the law. Because of this, a statutory 
solution is needed, and a bill should be passed that creates a 
standardized procedure that government agents must follow in 
order to get an order compelling decryption. The American 
government’s response to wiretapping is instructive, for 
wiretapping similarly involved the intersection of 
constitutional protections and modern technology. Fourth 
Amendment issues raised by wiretapping were initially 
handled by the judiciary; first in Olmstead v. United States,203 
  
 200 See TrueCrypt, Hidden Volume, http://www.truecrypt.org/hiddenvolume 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2009). 
 201 Id. (“[Y]ou should copy some sensitive-looking files that you actually do 
NOT want to hide. These files will be there for anyone who would force you to hand 
over the password.”). 
 202 Id. (“[I]t is impossible to prove whether there is a hidden volume within it 
or not, because free space on any TrueCrypt volume is always filled with random data 
when the volume is created and no part of the (dismounted) hidden volume can be 
distinguished from random data.” (emphasis added)). 
 203 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Court held wiretapping did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because they were reluctant to expand Fourth Amendment protections 
beyond the literal language of the text). 
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and later in Katz v. United States204. Then, in 1968, Congress 
passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 (“Omnibus Crime Control Act”), which functionally took 
the wiretapping issue out of the hands of the judiciary.205  
This new statute laid out a detailed set of procedures, 
discussed below, that police must follow in order to be granted 
permission to run a wiretap.206 From this statute, and the 
above-discussed experiences of the American and British 
approaches to compelled decryption, a number of 
recommendations for a statutory middle ground can be made. 
First, there should be an absolute prerequisite of prior 
approval by a member of the judiciary for the grant of a 
compelled decryption order. The Omnibus Crime Control Act 
contains a similar requirement with regards to prior judicial 
approval for wiretaps.207 Such a requirement would likely ease 
some of the criticism that would be leveled at a RIPA-like bill 
in America.208 Congress should not incorporate the portions of 
RIPA that allow compelled decryption orders to be authorized 
by non-judicial actors like high-ranking police, Customs and 
Excise, and military officers.  
Second, Congress would have to account for the fact that 
the act of being compelled to produce a password or an 
encryption key can communicate any of the three incriminating 
Fisher elements: the existence of the plaintext, the defendant’s 
control over the plaintext, and the authenticity of the 
  
 204 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Court overruled Olmstead holding that the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment extended to a government listening device 
attached a phone booth because it constituted a search). 
 205 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2522 (2006).  
 206 Id. § 2518. 
 207 Id. § 2518(1) (“Each application for an order authorizing or approving the 
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter shall be 
made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall 
state the applicant’s authority to make such application.”). 
 208 An example of the American preference for prior judicial approval can be 
found in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding search warrants. The Supreme 
Court has stated its preference for neutral magistrates, and not police officers 
personally involved in criminal investigations, to issue search warrants. Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (stating a preference for search warrant decisions 
to be made “by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”); see also Mark 
Tran, RIP Bill and Civil Liberties, GUARDIAN, June 12, 2000, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/jun/12/qanda.marktran (quoting British 
“inventor of the world wide web” Tim Berner-Lee as stating RIPA “would have been 
thrown out in the US ‘in a second’” as it “gives the government great power to abuse 
personal liberties” and commercial innovation). 
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plaintext.209 This could be accomplished by requiring, through 
means unrelated to the defendant’s act of producing the 
password, proof of the existence of the plaintext, proof that the 
defendant has control of the plaintext, and proof that the 
plaintext is authentic.210 The standard of proof by which the 
government would have to prove each of these elements, in 
keeping with the Omnibus Crime Control Act,211 could be 
probable cause. 
Third, a compelled decryption order should only be 
available for a certain list of specifically enumerated crimes. 
Such an approach was taken in the Omnibus Crime Control 
Act, which limits the types of crimes for which a wiretap may 
be sought.212 Commensurate with the serious intrusion on 
privacy, compelled decryption orders should only be available 
to law enforcement when the serious nature of the crime merits 
compelled disclosure. 
Fourth, for a compelled decryption order, Congress 
should require that the government agent meet a heavy burden 
of proof in order to receive judicial approval.213 In the Omnibus 
Crime Control Act, the burden of proof typically required is 
probable cause,214 and that same level could be applied in a new 
compelled decryption statute. This burden could function on 
several fronts. First, the government should prove that the 
subject of the order is actually in possession of the encryption 
key or password.215 Second, the government should demonstrate 
that it has exhausted all other possible methods of obtaining 
the plaintext short of compelled disclosure.216 Third, the 
  
 209 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66. 
 210 The idea the government should be required to account for each of the 
three Fisher elements was proposed in an article by Aaron M. Clemens. See Clemens, 
supra note 27, at 1. Mr. Clemens recommended that the burden for proving each of 
these elements should be clear and convincing evidence. Id. Notably, this concept rings 
of the foregone conclusion doctrine in that if the government can already prove the 
three assertions of Fisher, nothing would be gained by compelling disclosure, and any 
incriminating assertions accompanying the act of production would be a foregone 
conclusion. See supra text accompanying notes 104-106. 
 211 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d). 
 212 Id. § 2516(1). 
 213 This burden could, for example, be proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even 
clear and convincing evidence. 
 214 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). 
 215 Cf. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, ch. 23, § 49(2)(a) (Eng.). 
RIPA only requires that there by “reasonable grounds” to believe that the person 
served with the section 49 notice actually be in possession of the key, and a higher 
standard of proof would be better suited to a new American approach. Id. 
 216 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (Judge may only authorize wiretap if “normal 
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be 
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government should demonstrate that the plaintext it seeks 
goes to a material issue of their investigation.217 Lastly, the 
government should prove that one of the specifically 
enumerated crimes has been, or is about to be, committed.218  
Fifth, it is likely that an equivalent to RIPA’s Section 54 
gag order would not pass muster in America.219 Based on the 
controversy surrounding similar provisions related to National 
Security Letters, any compelled disclosure statute would wisely 
omit any analogous section. 
Sixth, the compelled decryption statute should precisely 
lay out the technical procedures that must be followed in order 
to obtain a compelled decryption order. For example, in 
borrowing from features of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, the 
statute could require that the application for the compelled 
decryption order include factual details pertaining to the 
identity of the suspect,220 the physical location and description 
of the electronic files to be decrypted,221 the other methods the 
police have exhausted to get the plaintext,222 and the factual 
details from the investigation that have led the police to believe 
that the suspect has committed, or is about to commit, a 
crime.223 
CONCLUSION 
As the use of encryption becomes increasingly prevalent, 
governments will face a growing need to develop a 
comprehensive and coordinated response to situations where 
powerful encryption stands between the government and 
valuable evidence. The responses by Great Britain and 
America, while entirely different, are uniquely problematic. 
Nonetheless, the lessons of each, in addition to the Omnibus 
  
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous”). RIPA only requires that it not be 
“reasonably practicable” to acquire the plaintext in another manner. See Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act, ch. 23, § 49(2)(d). A higher standard of proof would be better 
suited to a new statutory approach to compelled decryption.  
 217 This would ensure that compelled decryption orders were only being used 
when absolutely necessary for the successful prosecution of a crime. 
 218 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (Judge may only authorize wiretap if there is 
“probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about 
to commit a particular offense”). 
 219 See supra text accompanying notes 189-194. 
 220 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b). 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. § 2518(1)(c). 
 223 Id. § 2518(1)(b). 
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Crime Control Act, offer valuable insight into the creation of a 
more enlightened statutory approach.  
The British statutory response very effectively gives law 
enforcement the ability to compel decryption in furtherance of 
criminal investigations, but it does so at too high a cost to civil 
liberties. The American approach, as exemplified by Judge 
Niedermeier’s opinion in Boucher, does an excellent job of 
protecting civil liberties, but leaves law enforcement severely 
handicapped in its ability to investigate and prosecute serious 
crimes. Criminals with even minimal technical expertise are 
able to hide their activities behind virtually unbreakable walls 
of encryption, and the American government would be 
practically powerless to access the evidence.  
Thus, while both the British and American approaches 
to compelled decryption are valuable, they are also fraught 
with their own unique difficulties. Consequently, America 
should seek a middle ground that better takes into account the 
competing ideals of civil liberty and law enforcement interests. 
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